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Over the last 12 years, Chile has been very successful in attracting private
participation into the provision of Public Infrastructure. Private capital has gone into
road infrastructure, ports and airports all over the country in the form of Concessions.
The aim of the 1991 Concession Law, and that of the specific contracts associated with
each project, has been to provide much-needed infrastructure efficiently and without
committing government resources better employed elsewhere. Using the contracts of
four infrastructure projects involving the private sector in Chile, we show that even
though these projects and the Concessions Program are positively evaluated, design
flaws in the auction setup directly or indirectly reduced competition in the bidding
process, negatively affected performance, created incentives for ex-post renegotiation
and precluded welfare maximization.
 JEL Classification: L21, L33.
Keywords: Contracts, concessions, bidding.
1. INTRODUCTION
It is well known that contract design affects the efficiency of the productive
outcome through effects on performance and on the incentives generated for ex-post
renegotiation. The effects of contract design on commitment, performance and
development have been highlighted in several settings, such as regulation and
privatization (see Levy and Spiller, 1996). In this paper we focus on concessions. It has
also been recognized in the literature that differences in institutional settings produce
different results, making cross country comparisons of limited use. A more promising
approach to the crucial question of the effect of contract design on performance and
development is to look at different contracts within a single country, thus controlling for
differences in institutional endowment.
One of the most important economic reforms implemented in Chile over the last
fifteen years was the enactment of an Infrastructure Concessions Law, aimed at
increasing private sector participation in infrastructure projects. The law heralded an
important change in the whole concept of infrastructure investment. Between 1993 and
2001 thirty road and airport concession projects were awarded, making up a total
investment of US$5 billion: an increase of more than 500 percent in infrastructure2 GOVERNMENT CONCESSION CONTRACTS IN CHILE
investment over the decade. Analysis of Concession Contracts in Chile requires an
awareness of the legal framework in which these are situated. The most relevant
regulations are contained in the 1991 Concessions Law and the specific Auction Rules
governing the bidding process and the technical and economic bids put forward by
participants. It is worth noting that the winning bid itself makes up an integral part of the
final concession contract as do the bidding rules under which the auction takes place.
Chile’s concessions program has performed relatively well, but some criticism of design,
renegotiation incentives and performance has made itself heard.
1
The Infrastructure Concessions Law and recent government infrastructure
programs have two main aims. The first of these is to increase investment and improve
efficiency by bringing in private firms with experience in the sector. Efficiency improves
because direct price regulation becomes unnecessary, thus eliminating the need for the
regulator to obtain cost information from firms: a traditional problem of asymmetric
information. Secondly, by charging users of the infrastructure the investment is financed
by them, which is both an equitable and an efficient finance structure, and one that frees
government resources for other ends.
The purpose of this paper is to test the hypothesis that even with a relatively
successful Concession Program experience such as Chile’s, design issues and specific
provisions added to the contracts by interested parties negatively affect the bidding rules.
In particular, we analyze how these issues and provisions reduced competition in the
bidding process and affected performance, generating incentives for ex-post
renegotiation and precluding welfare maximization.
We analyze the contracts behind four infrastructure projects involving private
participation. All these contracts are currently in force. The main problems in these cases
arose because the regulator did not take full advantage of the competitive forces
available. We conclude that each contract’s performance was adversely affected by the
design of the auction rules and specific contract provisions: the design flaw shared by
these contracts is that they made only limited use of competition in the bidding process.
The paper has four sections. Section 2 describes the contracts, the objectives of
the different parties and the institutional setting. Section 3 analyzes four contracts, three
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of them written in accordance with the Infrastructure Concession Law (The El Melon
Tunnel, the Santiago - San Antonio Freeway, and the Santiago International Airport). A
fourth contract, also analyzed in this section, operates under a different legal framework,
but also required a concession by the government (the allocation of the 1900 MHz
frequency for Personal Communications Systems, PCS). Section 4 concludes.
2. THE NATURE OF THE CONTRACTS
In most cases where a monopoly right for the provision of public infrastructure is
auctioned off, the number of potential bidders is relatively small. Thus, the situation is
generally one of bilateral monopoly, which standard economic theory suggests could
lead to indeterminacy in the distribution of the gains from trade. The theory of auctions
solves this indeterminacy by considering the seller to be a Stackelberg leader with the
first move, which results in a commitment to a certain set of Auction Rules known to the
bidders when the auction begins. These rules bind the auction organizer such that
bidders know that the auction procedures cannot be changed after bids are observed,
even though it might be in the organizer’s interest to do so ex-post (McAffee and
McMillan, 1987).
2 Thus commitment to previously established rules is a central element
of the auction theory. These rules determine the incentives that bidders face during the
bidding process and also the ex-post incentives present once the monopoly right has
been granted, in particular the incentive to renegotiate.
Since the Auction Rules are decisive for both the terms of the final contract and
the contractual outcome (Klemperer, 2002), and the incentives faced by different players
affect the design (Aghion, Alesina, and Trebbi, 2002), both incentives and the clauses
and provisions contained in contracts are vital to performance evaluation.
2.1. Infrastructure Concession Contracts
Infrastructure concessions are contracts between the State and a private firm
through which the latter obtains the right to provide a service to a market in which the
provider has significant market power (Kerf et al., 1996, p.1). A key aspect of
                                                                
2 However, it is important to note that the ability to extract all the gains from trade by the first mover is limited
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concession contracts is that the State may induce private actors to compete among
themselves for the contract. Such an outcome may be equivalent to second best
regulation (Demsetz, 1968)
3. However, this result requires close attention to design,
implementation and the specific terms of the contracts.
4
It is well known that contract design affects efficiency. For instance, granting
the concession to the firm who pays the government the largest amount redistributes
monopoly rents. In turn, granting the contract to the bidder that promises the lowest
consumer price may solve the efficiency problem for a single product monopolist, but
may not be the appropriate criteria in the case of a multi product monopolist. Using
simple clauses that enhance competition within the field is an important lesson drawn
from Demsetz (1968). However, for a variety of reasons, including the fact that
unexpected events may occur once the monopoly right is granted and operating, it may
be important to have ways of adjusting the contract to unexpected conditions. The
problem with such flexibility is that it may induce renegotiation, which in turn may
distort the spirit of the process and lead one party to take advantage of sunk investments
made by the other. Thus, writing contracts so as to attain a balance between flexibility
and the risk of renegotiation must be a central goal of good contract design.
2.2. Objectives and the Parties Involved
Demsetz obtains the theoretical result that an auction for the right to be a
monopolist – with the winning bid being that promising to charge the lowest consumer
price – will yield second best efficiency. However, this is for a one period model with a
single product and no externalities. While relaxing some of these assumptions should not
change the main result in theory, in practice it may do so. These processes tend to have
more than a single variable to be bid upon because the regulator generally has additional
concerns, such as avoiding the exertion of monopoly power once the contract is granted,
improving the access of the poorest consumers to the sector, and managing externalities.
One way to cope with such problems has been to include more auction variables.
However, the problem with introducing more variables and especially non-economic
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variables (i.e., variables which are difficult to quantify) is that it becomes more difficult
to rely on economic competition to obtain the desired result. In addition, while including
more variables permits the pursuit of more objectives, these will not only differ from
maximization of social welfare, but may in fact clash directly with it.
Pursuing a single clear objective is difficult in institutional settings where there
tend to be many objectives and interests in play which must be balanced. Such clarity
becomes much more important when one of the objectives has direct consequences for
the institution setting the rules. This occurs for instance when the institution loses
funding when infrastructure investment is transferred to a private firm: in such a case a
different source of funding may be required once the concession is granted. Moreover,
there is a risk that the institution – especially if it is directly involved in the process of
granting the concession – will attempt to shape the design for its own benefit, or even
effectively boycott the process by imposing obligations on the private firm that are
difficult to fulfill.
5
On the other hand, public officials in charge of the process usually have rather
narrow and limited objectives. For example, goals such as “privatize firms”, “maximize
the number of private firms interested in the project”, or “obtain the largest possible
payment for the government” are common among public sector officials. It is rare that
public sector officials in charge of implementing such projects are evaluated on how
effectively they sought long-term efficiency. Most Latin American privatization
processes have been judged on the proceeds obtained from the sale of privatized firms,
rather than on how these firms performed when in the private sector. The situation is the
same when the performance is judged by the number of firms participating in the
bidding process: the lack of participation is considered a failure.
6
Recent experience of privatization in Latin America suggests that goals tend to be
narrowly defined – maximize sales revenue, obtain a speedy end to the process, build the
project as quickly as possible – and successful attainment of these goals is rewarded by
promotions for the government officials in charge, with the blame for poor regulation
falling on others. This, in part, is due to the absence of a real civil service in Chile, as it
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is in fact the case in most Latin American countries. The continuous changes in the
government officials responsible for policies, reduces their incentives to keep historical
reputation high.
7
3. LESSONS FROM INFRASTRUCTURE CONTRACTS
In this section we analyze four contracts between the private sector and the
Chilean government. Three of them were signed under the framework of the 1991
Infrastructure Concessions Law. A fourth contract, under a different law, exemplifies the
traditional relationship between the government and private sector. This contract, and the
similarity of the problems encountered, serves to illustrate the fact that these issues are
not simply the product of the Concessions Law.
In all these contracts, the Auction Rules established that the bidders had to submit
a technical and a financial offer. The technical offer usually included a description of the
firm and a summary of its experience on similar projects, and the technical and financial
specifications. The Auction Rules also defined the responsibilities of each party, the
services to be provided and who was to pay for the service. Contracts were granted to the
bidder that offered the best conditions as defined by the Auction Rules. The Technical
and Financial Offers became an integral part of the contract for the auction winner.
Whilst all the contracts we analyze involved private sector participation, and
three employed the concession legislation, it is clear that interested parties’ involvement
in the design of the rules negatively affected performance from an efficiency point of
view. The interests of such parties were often quite different in nature (and were not
necessarily directed towards narrow self-interest), but they all had a pervasive effect on
allocative efficiency. Our analysis also shows how the design, and in particular the
choice of the auction variable affects the incentives for post contractual negotiation, a
dynamic efficiency issue.
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3.1. The El Melon Tunnel: contract design and post contractual incentives.
The El Melon Tunnel was the first infrastructure project built and operated under
the Concessions Law in Chile. It is a tunnel located 130 kilometers North of Santiago
allowing drivers to avoid the El Melon hill, a steep single-lane hill road. The tunnel
reduces travel time considerably and does not merely improve existing infrastructure,
which has been the case with most of the infrastructure projects put up for concession up
to 2003.
8
The Auction Rules specified the construction period, operations startup and
penalty procedures in case of delays, unauthorized service interruptions, charges above
those authorized, delays in providing information required by the Ministry of Public
Works (MPW) and other delays. The Rules also established procedures for the land
expropriations required to build the project, an important source of risk. The
expropriation would be carried out by the MPW and the payment, within a certain range,
would be made by the concessionaire. The Fiscal Inspector was charged with monitoring
the project’s progress during the construction stage. The Auction Rules also established
a maximum debt-equity ratio and a minimum equity requirement to reduce the risk of
the concessionaire going bankrupt. A detailed budget and financing program were
required, together with an investment analysis and an estimate of expected costs.
Several simultaneous bidding variables were used: the toll charged per vehicle, an
inflation adjustment rule, the length of the concession period, warranties requested from
the State, additional services offered and a payment from or to the State. That is, a bidder
could (and all eventually did) offer a payment to the State financed from the toll charged
to the vehicles using the tunnel. More precisely, the bidder had to offer an average toll
per vehicle per hour, without discriminating among users, with a cap established in the
Rules. The adjustment formula was for 100 percent of the CPI, but it was left to the
bidder to decide on the length of the adjustment period as part of their offer: it could be
every 3, 6 or 12 months, with a longer lag length making for a more competitive offer.
9
In April 1993, the project was awarded to a consortium led by Endesa S.A.,
their offer defeating the three others that fulfilled all the technical requirements.
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However, the financial offers of all these bidders (Belfi, Chilquinta, Dragados and
Endesa) were almost identical. They all offered the maximum toll allowed, the
maximum concession period, requested the maximum guaranteed income from the State
and the minimum length for the adjustment period. The only variable in which there was
competition and which was obviously decisive was the payment offered to the State.
There were large differences among the bids on this variable: Belfi offered an annual
payment of US$ 1 million, Chilquinta US$ 1.4 million, Dragados US$ 24,000 and
Endesa US$ 3.4 million.
Thus despite a seemingly sophisticated auction formula, competition was in fact
focused on a single variable: the size of the payment to the State. This should not be
cause for surprise however as technology exists that assists firms in structuring their
bids. Firms compare the change in the score received by their bid with the effect of a
change in each variable on net present value. For a given change in the net present value
of the project the variable that increases the score the most is chosen by the firm. Each
variable is set to an optimum level, restricting competition to the most bid-score
effective variable for a given cost. Variables set to maximum allowed levels
(uncompetitive) will be those that have a very low effect on the bid score for a given cost
in net present value. Therefore, it is no coincidence that all concessionaires chose to
compete on the same variable. The relevant question, given that this was common
knowledge for the auction designers, was why the auction included so many variables if
only one was relevant.
Our interpretation is that the rules were designed to ensure that this first
concession project would be made and thus, perceived as a success. The MPW feared
that if the project was awarded using the toll charge as the bidding variable, the revenues
might have not been enough to cover the costs. Furthermore, provided that a substitute
road existed, the maximum revenue for the concessionaire required a toll where the
elasticity of demand was -1. Higher tolls would reduce revenues. Uncertainty as to
demand made the project risky and it was in the interest of the government for the first
project in the concessions program to appear attractive to the private sector. It is likely
that this induced the government to design an auction that would ensure such a result.
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Moreover, if no firms had participated in the process it might have been interpreted as a
failure for the newly created Private Concessions Law and a signal that, despite the
rhetoric, the new center-left political coalition was uninterested in working with the
private sector.
10
To avoid this, the MPW effectively provided the project with two safeguards:
i)  guaranteed minimum traffic levels for the system as a whole
11, and
ii)  the payment requested from the State (which could be positive or negative) was
included as a bidding variable.
Thus, the relevant bidding variable (the payment to or from the State), guaranteed
that some firms would be interested in the project even if it were not socially profitable.
In this respect, the auction design ensured that even proposed projects adversely
affecting efficiency would be considered. Moreover, given that the payment to the
government was the bidding variable and thus the variable set at the most competitive
level, the design implied a high toll, creating efficiency losses associated with the traffic
reduction and thus generating incentives for ex post renegotiation.
Since operations began in 1995 the operator has consistently lost money despite
charging high tolls relative to those charged in the rest of the country, including other
newly privatized roads. Simultaneously, and despite the losses, it must make the regular
payment to the State that was promised in its bid, plus an extra amount associated with
an income sharing clause depending on the traffic through the whole system, that
includes the alternative road.
Other political economy consequences are clear. The high tolls faced by
consumers result in some vehicles avoiding the tunnel, creating pressure for
renegotiation not only from the concessionaire but also from consumers. The latter argue
that the concessionaire could reduce the tolls if it did not have to pay the more than US$
3 million it promised in its (winning) bid. The lobby suggests that a change in the
                                                                
10 The new political coalition took office in 1990, after 17 years of the military government that had
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auction with too few bidders will be both unprofitable for the auctioneer and potentially inefficient (Klemperer
2001).
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tunnel and the existing hill road taken together.10 GOVERNMENT CONCESSION CONTRACTS IN CHILE
contract would benefit consumers (of course, to the detriment of taxpayers who do not
use the tunnel and need to finance the US$3 million).
While the government has resisted pressures to renegotiate thus far, these
pressures are direct consequences of the auction design.  Though there are reasons to
explain the poor performance exhibited by the firm, strategic behavior and low-balling in
the bidding process cannot be discarded.
12
3.2. The Santiago International Airport: maximizing proceeds from a monopoly.
An airport’s location can provide its concessionaire with monopoly power. This
explains why not only the runway, but the airport itself may be considered a type of
natural monopoly and a clear candidate for the concessions program.
13
Different institutions are responsible for regulating the airport concession in
Chile. The MPW designs and enforces the contract, while the General Directorate of
Civil Aviation (DGAC), the civil aeronautical authority, monitors security and
aeronautical services. In addition the Ministry of Finance has veto power over the design
of the Auction Rules, since keeping a balanced budget is its responsibility. While all
these institutions participated in the concession design, the DGAC had a central role in
defining the terms and conditions under which the services were included and in
defining the bidding variables. This point is of relevance because pre-concession the
DGAC was in charge of operating both the airport and all relevant services.
14
The concession of the Santiago International Airport (AMB) consisted of a
leasing, development and operation contract for both aeronautical and non-aeronautical
services for fifteen years. The project required building new facilities in the passenger
                                                                
12 Construction cost exceeded the budget estimated by the MPW and by the concessionaire by about 30
percent. A technical error in the prediction of traffic is unlikely. An error in estimating demand elasticity is
more probable.
13 Some of the services offered by an airport face enough competition and hence do not need to be regulated,
such as the duty free shops and food and beverage services, all of which can be obtained outside the airport at
some additional but not significant cost. Other services such as communications and parking are not strictly
necessary to an airport’s operation but are highly complementary. Some of these may not face enough
competition because of their privileged location with regard to their competition and therefore may need to be
regulated to some extent. Finally, there are services that are an essential part of an airport, such as the
embarkation/disembarkation system, airside platform services and catering, counters and support areas for the
airlines. There are some differences in the degree of competition in these essential services. The
embarkation/disembarkation systems, for instance, lack good substitutes. As these services are essential for
airline competition, it is important that they be price regulated and provided on a non-discriminatory basis.
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and freight terminals that would increase the existing capacity by a factor of 3 and 1.5
respectively, with total investment estimated at US$ 100 million.
The process began in June 1997 with the publication of the Auction Rules and the
concession was granted in February 1998. During the four-month period between the
publication of the Auction Rules and the submission of the bids, 13 firms participated in
the process and over 1,000 questions about the Rules were received. The answers to the
questions were published in 14 documents that became part of the Auction Rules.
The Auction Rules defined the services to be provided by the concessionaire, and
explicitly excluded a number of services that would continue to be provided by the
DGAC. Some concessionaire-provided services were subject to price regulation, such as
the embarkation and disembarkation system, rental of the airside platform service areas
and the catering areas. Among the non-aeronautical services, some were mandatory:
food, parking, communications, counters, offices, duty free shops and public transport,
while the rest were voluntary. The Rules also specified conditions that would lead to an
early termination of the contract.
The Ministry of Finance sets an airport tax per passenger (about US$ 8 and US$
18 for national and international passengers respectively at the moment the auction took
place). The revenues from this tax had always gone to the DGAC and they make up its
core budget. When the Auction Rules were published, they established the bidding
variable as the lowest amount requested from this airport tax, with a cap of US$ 7 per
passenger. The difference between the tax set by the Ministry of Finance, which was not
modified as a part of this process, and the amount requested by the successful bidder
would still be revenue for the DGAC. Therefore, the bidding variable was not the final
price paid by consumers and airlines, but rather the net price received by the DGAC.
However 15 days before the closing date the MPW modified the bidding variable by
adding two further conditions: i) the minimum amount that could be requested by
bidders was set at US$1.5, and ii) the percentage reduction in the prices of the regulated
services could not exceed 70 percent. The new Auction Rules also obliged the winner to
pay the DGAC US$2.5 million annually for the first 5 years and US$2 million
thereafter.
15
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In addition, the Auction Rules specified two types of performance goals, one
associated with the construction of airport facilities and another associated with airport
operation. The first was clearly defined and thus, there was no room for discretionary
behavior from any party. However, this was not the case for the performance indicators
for airport operation. Given the nature of the services provided by the airport, quality
considerations are relevant and each bidder had to include an Operations Manual as part
of their technical offer.  This manual established the airport’s operational procedures and
quality standards, and defined them with reference to a similar airport abroad managed
by one of the members participating in the consortium.
16
In short, the Auction Rules ensured that the concession would be granted to the
bidder requesting the lowest fee per passenger within an allowed range, and offering the
largest reduction from the maximum prices specified in the auction rules for regulated
services provided by the concessionaire. If the bidding process resulted in a tie in terms
of economic offers, the winner would be the consortia with the best technical offer.
The result was that the seven consortia that presented bids made exactly the same
economic offer. They requested the minimum possible amount per passenger and offered
the maximum reduction allowed for prices in the regulated services. Thus the project
was awarded according to the maximum score obtained by the technical offers, turning
the process into a “beauty contest” in which technical aspects such as experience,
“quality of the project” and the quality of the “Operating Manuals and Procedures”, were
all evaluated and assigned scores. Since all these concepts are hard to define objectively,
the losers challenged the scores assigned to each consortium in court, but eventually the
scores were upheld.
The incentives involved in this process are more easily understood when we look
at which economic agents were directly affected. Two types of consumers were involved
in the airport concession: passengers (and freight customers) and airlines. Passengers
face high costs of organizing themselves into an effective lobby and thus were not actors
of any relevance in the process. Moreover, competition in the bidding process was not
guaranteed to affect them directly: it would only do so if competition in the airline
industry forced airlines to pass cost reductions through to consumers or through
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increases in the quality of the services provided. On the other hand the airlines were both
interested and successful in modifying the bidding variables, resulting in significant
price reductions in regulated services with regard to the levels initially stated in the
Auction Rules.
Another interested party, as described above, was the DGAC. This institution was
a major beneficiary of the auction design. Restricting competition in the bidding process
by setting regulated prices “too high,” imposing a floor on reductions in regulated prices,
and requesting an annual amount from the winning consortium limited the percentage of
the airport tax necessary to finance the project. In fact, this minimized the difference
between the fee set by the Ministry of Finance and the amount requested by the bidder
that won, setting it to the lowest level allowed under the Rules. Effectively, the rules
maximized the DGAC’s final budget.
Finally, in addition to the factors mentioned which all suggest the existence of
welfare costs, competition was restricted to a non-economic variable. The winner was
not necessarily or even probably the most efficient consortium because the lack of
transparency involved in such a subjective but supposedly technical decision: the
weights attached to non-economic aspects are seldom even defined technically. By
changing the Auction Rules only slightly – for instance by awarding the project to the
bidder who offered to return the facilities the earliest – the beauty contest type allocation
that occurred could have been avoided.  This type of clause was ruled out on
unconvincing grounds (it was argued that a minimum period was required to make the
project profitable). The opposition of the DGAC to such clause is easily explained:
competition on any economic variable would reduce rents, and hence the consortia
would have requested a larger share of airport tax, reducing the revenue received by the
DGAC.
3.3. The Allocation of Radioelectric Frequencies for the PCS mobile telephone
system
In November 1995 the Undersecretary of Telecommunications (Subtel), the
Telecoms regulator, opened a bidding process to auction off three national concessions
in the 1900 MHz band for mobile telephony (Personal Communication Systems). The
process was not without controversy because of the uncertainty produced by a set of14 GOVERNMENT CONCESSION CONTRACTS IN CHILE
Auction Rules which even made it very difficult for bidders to evaluate their own
projects. Nonetheless, in October 1996 the frequencies were granted.
The main elements of the Telecommunications Law are that final consumer
prices are unregulated
17, and that Subtel must assign concessions at no cost to those who
request them, except when there is excess demand in which case Subtel run a
competitive tender process. The Law also determines what the Auction Rules must
consider, and the technical requirements the bidders must fulfill. Specifically, bidders
are required to present a technical project with details of service provision and operation,
and a financial project. The law also prohibits ex post modifications to winning bids and
establishes penalties for cases in which the concessionaire fails to meet the technical
conditions, stages and terms under which the concession was granted.
The Auction Rules stated that the most relevant bidding variable in the economic
offer was coverage, which was calculated by weighting population densities in different
areas. The Rules contained detailed requirements with respect to installation, operation,
types of services and the project’s execution time frame, which was not to exceed 5
years. The Rules also considered two financial guarantees, one of US$ 750,000, and the
other amounting to US$ 42.5 million, to ensure the investment and operation of the
project. The second guarantee was to be reduced progressively with the completion of
successive stages. In June 1997, official results were published granting the three
concessions as table 1 shows.
TABLE 1
RESULTS OF THE SPECTRUM AUCTION IN THE 1900 MHZ BANDWIDTH
1st place 2nd place 3rd place






Partners Entel     :     59.16 %
Motorola  : 40.84%
Télex            : 50%
Qualcomm   : 50 %
Entel          : 80%
Qualcomm : 20%
Score 98.35 85.98 76.77
Technology CDMA TDMA (original) GSM
N° Stations 136 188 167
Bandwidth C B A
Counties Served 302 228 249
Execution  Period 6 months 18 months 60 months
                                                                
17 Unless the Antitrust Commission considers that there is a lack of competition in a market in which case the
prices would have to be regulated.DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO Nº 258 15
Source: Subtel.
As in the previous cases, the interests of the institutions and parties involved in
the process diverged greatly. The mobile telephony companies tried to delay the process
and thus the entry of new competitors. In May 1996 the Antitrust Commission
recommended that the concession should not be granted to a firm already holding a
concession. Subtel, the institution that finally decided on the Auction Rules, did not
follow this recommendation as Subtel’s objective is to guarantee universal service,
which is clearly not the same as promoting competition. Furthermore, it became
apparent that Subtel was pushing for the implementation of the PCS as quickly as
possible, wishing to place the sector on the technology frontier.
18
When maximizing welfare there are more efficient and more transparent ways of
allocating frequencies than through competition on coverage. Given that the number of
frequencies is fixed and no monopoly right was involved, the most direct and efficient
method was to allocate frequencies to the firms willing to pay the most. Allocating
frequencies on the basis of providing the greatest coverage in the shortest period of time
leads to inefficiencies such as coverage provision in areas where it is not economically
convenient to do so. Whilst it may be true that more traffic should be associated with
lower tariffs, more traffic is not necessarily associated with geographical coverage but
with demand which naturally varies across counties and regions. The weights placed on
coverage in the Auction Rules were based upon population, which is consistent with a
universal service objective rather than with the aim of satisfying mobile telephony
demand. In addition, the incentives created by the Auction Rules provided an incentive
to speed up investment and cross subsidize with little regard for economic efficiency.
As in the case of the El Melon tunnel, incentives to renegotiate rapidly emerged.
Renegotiation to allow delays in investment in some counties was easily justified on
theoretical grounds. Increasing coverage and speeding up investment timing was
economically inefficient, providing an incentive to renegotiate the contract. This made
                                                                
18 The above considerations may also explain why Subtel did not resolve some apparently minor problems ex
ante, such as the repossession of frequencies operated by the military.  Instead, it left this issue to the firms.
How these frequencies were to be repossessed, and the cost of the process were extremely uncertain,
eventually leading to court appearances.16 GOVERNMENT CONCESSION CONTRACTS IN CHILE
itself felt in two ways: firstly by exerting pressure to push back the deadline for coverage
fulfillment, and secondly by forcing changes in favor of the firms providing the service.
In January 1998 Entel asked for permission to merge its two projects and thus
fulfill only the total coverage offered by its two projects. Whilst merging the projects
was efficient, it was in complete contradiction with the aim of maximizing coverage by
granting the concession to three firms. However, it was allowed by a provisional permit
which was later challenged in Court by rival firms, arguing that this was against both the
Auction Rules and the law.
The sequencing of inspection and execution of the projected investment
illustrates how renegotiation occurred. On December 30
th 1997 Subtel declared itself
unsatisfied with the supposedly finished Entel PCS project, because 10 of the 210
stations due were not ready. According to the contract, the guarantee was forfeit.
However, Entel moved quickly to certify by Public Notary that in the period between
Subtel’s report and the final date, it had solved the problem (that is, between 21:00 and
24:00 hours on December 30th). Entel presented the report to Subtel and simultaneously
presented a legal appeal to the courts on January 5th 1998.
19 Subtel accepted Entel’s
position and decided after several delays and in conjunction with a report from the
Comptroller General not to execute the guarantee. This led to Subtel receiving two
formal complaints.
A second avenue of renegotiation was found in the implementation of the so-
called “calling party pays” protocol. This system was considered critical to the mobile
companies’ competitive position. Throughout the process Subtel consistently held that
“calling party pays” was not part of the Auction Rules. However, by then it was clear
that to avoid problems and accusations of defining the rules of the game on an ex-post
basis, it was wisest to explicitly deal with the protocol as part of the process. Subtel had
no legal tools to implement such a policy and was only able to create the “calling party
pays” system through interconnection charges. That is, Subtel made it possible for
mobile companies to charge local companies an access fee so that an incoming call fee
was not required.
                                                                
19 In the argument, it was noted that the Auction Rules established that if work was rejected by Subtel the
concessionaire was obliged to correct the problem within the initial time period. This gave Entel only three
hours to solve the problem: grounds enough to argue in court that Subtel’s condition was unreasonable.DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO Nº 258 17
3.4  The Santiago-San Antonio Highway
The Santiago - San Antonio Highway contract consisted of building and
operating a highway between Santiago and San Antonio – arguably Chile’s largest cargo
port – located about 100 kms east of Santiago. The project essentially consisted of
improving the existing road. The Auction Rules stipulated an ad-hoc committee in
charge of evaluating technical aspects, minimum service standards, a 23 year operation
period and financial guarantees to allow penalization in case of delays. As in the case of
the El Melon tunnel, the Auction Rules guaranteed minimum traffic levels and an
income-sharing clause for extraordinarily high revenues based on estimated cost. The
concessionaire was forced to take on all the risks, including that associated with the toll
charging technology which was to be defined by the MPW after the concession was
awarded. Moreover the Government required a payment for pre-existing infrastructure,
consisting of 20 annual payments of US$ 4.8 million and an additional payment of
approximately US$ 145,000 per year for the first four years. Finally, as with other
infrastructure contracts the Auction Rules had some flexibility to allow the MPW to
modify some project characteristics. In such cases, the MPW would pay any additional
costs.
The bidding variable was the lowest toll charged (with a cap of US$ 5)
20 and
the Auction Rules established that in case of a tie the winner would be the bidder
requesting the lowest subsidy from (or offering the largest payment to) the State. Thus,
there was no polynomial equation with different weights, but rather a recursive process
with a payment which was relevant to the bidding only if the toll reached a predefined
cap.
Among the six offers considered technically acceptable, the winner was
Consorcio Infraestructura 2000, which offered a toll of US$ 1.74. The other bids offered
US$ 1.88, US$ 1.97, US$ 2.68, US$ 3.41, and US$ 3.53. Thus, the auction process was
relatively transparent and used a competitive economic mechanism that favored
consumers.
Notwithstanding the above, two years after the concession was granted and in
accordance with its rights under the Concessions Law, the MPW decided to modify the
                                                                
20 The Auction Rules established a relationship among different tolls such that once bidders made an offer for
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contract by requiring improved services, additional service roads, more accesses to the
highway, bypasses, improvements in local traffic, higher traffic flow standards and
additional safety measures. In addition, the project began operations late as a result of
expropriations delays which the MPW was responsible for.
These changes sparked a renegotiation process, focusing on three aspects: the
cost of the new facilities, the period that the concessionaire was not operating due to the
delay caused by the MPW and the amount and method of payment for the additional
costs. As such a change to the contract was legal it should not have allowed the private
sector to obtain any advantage in subsequent negotiations. However, the MPW’s
overriding desire to implement the changes led them to pay compensation by changing
the value of the auction variable: a non transparent and likely inefficient way of
resolving the matter.
Negotiations over compensation for costs caused by the delay in beginning
operations were difficult because rules for such a contingency were not included in the
Auction Rules. However, foregone revenue was easily estimated since once the
operation was underway traffic flow data was available.
A second major problem centered on estimating the opportunity cost of the idle
resources, an issue that was absent in the contract. This was unusual as these costs are
regularly included in standard contracts between the MPW and private parties.
With regard to the cost of the additional investment required by the MPW, the obvious
way of obtaining unit costs was to make use of the prices the MPW was using for its
other contracts. This did not occur. The Auction Rules required the bidder to report
estimated unit costs for the facilities, but there was no incentive for them to declare their
real estimated values. Quite the contrary: reporting higher values placed them in a
superior negotiating position.
A third component of the negotiations was the method of compensation for
additional cost. There were three legal alternatives: increased tolls, a longer operation
period or direct payments. The relationship between these alternatives is not trivial and
was the subject of negotiation. In practice, part of the compensation took place through
an increase in tolls. The negotiation focused on the effect on revenues that such an
increase would have, that is, on the value of the price elasticity of demand. The result of
the negotiation was an 18.1 percent increase in tolls, under the assumption that such anDOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO Nº 258 19
increase would lead a revenue increase of 11.9 percent (the implied price elasticity was -
0.25).
At least two lessons can be learned here. Firstly, even when a parameter is not
defined in the Auction Rules other readily available sources of parameter values should
be used to limit renegotiation. Secondly, when the Auction Rules are centered on a
single clear and transparent bidding variable – such as the price charged to users – it
should not be used to compensate the firm in renegotiations, since it is the result of a
competitive bidding process and was used to grant the monopoly right. Changing it later
through a renegotiation process or through an administrative decision reduces the
transparency of the process. If additional investments must be made, it is more
transparent to use available cost parameters to determine the total cost of required
investments and to pay this amount directly to the concessionaire without altering the
price that resulted from a competitive tender process. Of course, had the additional
investments been included in the original project, the price would have reflected all the
required investment.
We interpret the course of the renegotiation process as the result of the MPW’s
powerful interest in seeing the project completed. This lay behind the failure to use
readily available data to estimate additional costs and also the decision to use the toll
charged as the compensation method, thus reducing the transparency of the process.
4.  CONCLUSIONS
Chile’s well developed institutions and early commitment to private initiative
suggest that the problems highlighted in these concession contracts were not the product
of either corruption or incompetence. We have considered four different contracts from
which a number of lessons and policy implications may be drawn.
Firstly, all the contracts had more than one objective and these objectives were often at
least partially contradictory. A significant general objective was the government’s desire
to ensure that the project was undertaken. In the case of El Melon Tunnel, where the
bidding variable was the minimum sum requested from (or paid to) the State, an
efficiency problem emerged. High prices and the concessionaire’s losses, taken together
with payments promised to the State, created a consumer and concessionaire coalition to
lobby for a review of the contract.20 GOVERNMENT CONCESSION CONTRACTS IN CHILE
As is evident from the PCS frequency and road infrastructure concessions,
contract design and especially the choice of the bidding variable are vital to the auction
outcome because of their effect on incentives. Making use of some bidding variables
makes post-contractual renegotiations more likely than when others are used. The
contract is less efficient and renegotiations are more difficult to resolve when the bidding
variable is not an economic variable. Additionally, renegotiations in the case of the PCS
frequencies and the El Melon Tunnel were made more challenging because the bidding
variable did not affect consumers. It is important to remember that in most cases, and in
spite of the existence of complicated polynomial formulas that were supposed to include
several variables in the bidding process, there was only one bidding variable that was the
subject of competition. If the overriding objective is to ensure the participation of several
bidders and more than one bidding variable is used, it is worth making use of the
relevant economic variables so as to focus competition on economic aspects of the
project. This prevents the concession competition descending into a “beauty contest” at
the cost of both efficiency and transparency.
Secondly, design problems were worsened when an interested party was involved
in the process. The DGAC affected the Auction Rules in a way that finally led to a
beauty contest instead of an objectively competitive process based on an economic
variable. As this case shows, the design of the contract matters: efficiency and the
incentives for ex-post renegotiation are at stake. Hence it is vital to separate the ex post
role of each party in the process from its role in the contract design. In the airport
concession case, there was no clear definition of the DGAC role, and by distorting the
auction design this entity increased its budget at the cost of consumers. The DGAC not
only affected the choice of bidding variable, but also the tariff structure and floors, and
the size of the fixed annual payment. Moreover, from an efficiency point of view, the
concessionaire should take on  as many commercial activities as possible. In short, the
absence of both a budget and a clear ex post role for the DGAC, meant that the MPW
and the Ministry of Finance should have limited the DGAC’s participation in contract
design. A poorly defined contract also afflicted the PCS frequency auction, illustrating
that such problems are not strictly a product of the Concessions Law.  In this case,
Subtel’s goal – attaining the largest possible coverage as quickly as possible – clashed
with the Antitrust Commission’s recommendation to avoid granting frequencies to the
incumbent firm. Furthermore, Subtel’s goals induced renegotiation since forcing the firmDOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO Nº 258 21
to comply with inefficient investment scheduling plans could have put the firm in
financial risk.
Thirdly, the MPW prioritized the realization of the project and the reduction of
conflicts in the very short run instead of providing a general framework for
renegotiation. The government was keen to guarantee that it would not expropriate sunk
investments. Renegotiations may enhance efficiency by allowing both parties to react to
unanticipated contingencies, but a limit on such renegotiations must be imposed to avoid
corruption and excess. In the renegotiation cases reviewed the government paradoxically
introduced new criteria for cost determination that favored the concessionaire instead of
using parameters that were both at hand and constituted the natural solution. This
approach has effects not only on the current project but also on the behavior of
contractors on future projects. Moreover, while the law is flexible with regard to
methods of compensation in the case of negotiations, the contracts surprisingly fail to
include some obviously logical variables and fail to make explicit how compensation
will be paid.
Finally, changing the Auction Rules near the closing date for bids reduces
transparency and raises questions as to the agenda of the regulator. While the change
affects all participants, clearly some are affected more than others.  Furthermore, a
design change in which the effective bidding variable becomes the “technical project”
will benefit those with more experience and with more effective lobbyists, a change that
often brings efficiency costs in its wake.22 GOVERNMENT CONCESSION CONTRACTS IN CHILE
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